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REAL ESTATE
ECONOMICS
Macroeconomic Risk Factors and the Role
of Mispriced Credit in the Returns from
International Real Estate Securities
Andrey Pavlov,* Eva Steiner** and Susan Wachter***
We examine the canonical influence of global market, currency and inflation
risks on the returns from international real estate securities. In addition, we
study how mispricing of credit in the local banking systems is related to the
returns from these securities. We analyze a global sample of real estate se-
curities over the period 1999 to 2011 to test our hypotheses. We find support
for the anticipated relationships between macroeconomic risk factors and the
returns from international real estate securities. Our evidence also supports the
expected link between local credit market conditions and the performance of
international real estate securities.
What are the factors that drive the returns on international real estate securities?
Empirical research has established the importance of the world stock market,
regional influences and firm-level characteristics, such as size and value ef-
fects.1 However, Worzala and Sirmans (2003) conclude that the return drivers
of international real estate securities are insufficiently understood. Research in
international asset pricing highlights the role of macroeconomic factors, in par-
ticular a global market factor, inflation and foreign exchange rate risks (Solnik
1974, Grauer, Litzenberger and Stehle 1976, Sercu 1980). Yet, the canonical
influence of macroeconomic factors on international real estate securities has
not been established.2
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1See, for example, Eichholtz et al. (1998), Eichholtz and Huisman (2001), Case,
Goetzmann and Rouwenhorst (1999), Ling and Naranjo (2002), Hamelink and Hoesli
(2004) and Bond, Karolyi and Sanders (2003).
2A notable exception in this context is Bardhan, Edelstein and Tsang (2008), which
consider the local term spread and an indicator of a country’s economic openness.
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In this article, we jointly examine the empirical implications of the major in-
ternational asset pricing models for the time-series of international real estate
securities returns. Moreover, we employ this framework to identify the influ-
ence of an additional macroeconomic factor that derives from the local credit
market conditions and is intricately linked to the local real estate markets. We
develop a testable hypothesis of how local credit market conditions and the
mispricing of credit may impact the returns from international real estate se-
curities. Consequently, we augment our international asset pricing model with
a measure of mispriced credit. This measure captures underpriced default risk
and is based on the asset price response to changes in the lending spread in an
economy.3
The relationship between macroeconomic risk factors, credit market conditions
and firm performance is arguably of particular interest in the context of real
estate securities. These securities represent an interesting case study for two
main reasons. First, real estate is especially sensitive to credit market conditions
as the asset class is characterized, among others, by fixed short-run supply and
high capital intensity. Second, investors commonly employ real estate stocks in
order to gain exposure to the underlying direct real estate, the performance of
which is linked to the macroeconomy. As a result, the structure of the empirical
relationships among macroeconomic risk factors, credit market conditions and
the performance of real estate securities seems to be a natural but, to date,
underresearched question.
We primarily establish empirical evidence for the role of macroeconomic fac-
tors in explaining the time-series of international real estate returns. In addition,
our analysis also contributes to the literature on the relationship between credit
market conditions and the performance of real estate and financial assets. Re-
search to date has established the role of the credit volume supplied in an
economy in driving real estate values (Mian and Sufi 2009, Glick and Lansing
2010, Pavlov and Wachter 2011b). However, credit volume is endogenously
determined within the economy. Without information on the pricing of credit it
is impossible to identify whether credit volume changes as a result of demand
or supply effects, such as reduced credit standards, which are commonly named
as a driver of unsustainable real estate values. We contribute to this debate by
focusing on the relationship between the pricing of debt, the value of real estate
assets and how this filters through to the performance of financial assets that
are linked to real estate assets.
Further, research has only begun to attempt to identify the driving forces behind
the complex interactions between credit and real estate values. The existing
3See Pavlov and Wachter (2009), Allen and Gale (1999) and Allen (2001).
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literature in this area largely focuses on the residential sector. There are few
studies to date that examine commercial real estate.4
Here, we expand on this research by examining firm returns in the context
of an international asset pricing model that includes proxies for aggregate risk
factors, such as the return on the world stock market as well as residual country-
level stock market factors and other macroeconomic variables. Our framework
allows us to control for the argument put forward in Favilukis et al. (2012) that
aggregate risk drives real estate values via an easing of credit standards and thus
expansion of credit availability. Therefore, our set-up enables us to contribute
to this literature by isolating the effects related to the pricing of credit that are at
play within the real estate sector, net of changes in the perception of aggregate
risk in the economy.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In the next section, we
review the related literature. We then outline our empirical approach in the
section “Methodology” and describe data and descriptive statistics in the sec-
tion “Data.” Sections “Results” and “Robustness Tests” discuss our empirical
findings before reaching the “Conclusion.”
Related Literature
The conceptual background for this study is given by the international asset
pricing literature. Three seminal models describe international security returns
as a function of a global market factor, inflation and foreign exchange rate risk
(Solnik 1974, Grauer, Litzenberger and Stehle 1976, Sercu 1980). Consistent
with evidence from the US stock market, firm characteristics, such as size and
book-to-market ratio, also appear to capture a significant proportion of the
cross-sectional and time-series variation in international stock returns (Fama
and French 1998, 2011). However, it remains unclear whether underlying fun-
damental risks (Fama and French 1996) or behavioral biases (Lakonishok,
Shleifer and Vishny 1994, Daniel and Titman 1997) drive the premiums on
these factors. Further, there is an ongoing debate about whether any inter-
national factor, macroeconomic or characteristic-based, derives its premium
locally or globally (Fama and French 1998, Griffin 2002, Bekaert, Hodrick and
Zhang 2009, Hou, Karolyi and Kho 2011). Multifactor asset pricing models
appear to explain a significant proportion of the variation in real estate security
returns in a domestic (U.S.) context (Chan, Hendershott and Sanders 1990, Ling
and Naranjo 1997, Karolyi and Sanders 1998, Ling and Naranjo 1999, Ling,
Naranjo and Ryngaert 2000). Against this background, and with increasing
4Exceptions are Pavlov and Wachter (2011b), Allen (2001) and Allen and Gale (1999).
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data availability, the real estate literature has begun to address some of these
questions in the context of international real estate asset pricing.
A number of empirical studies examine the evidence for global versus regional
factors in explaining the returns on international real estate securities (Eichholtz
et al. 1998, Case, Goetzmann and Rouwenhorst 1999, Eichholtz and Huisman
2001, Ling and Naranjo 2002). This evidence generally supports the notion
of global pricing alongside the significance of a residual local or regional
market factor that persists in the presence of the global factor. A parallel
stream of studies expands the set of potential predictors to international firm-
level characteristic factors and presents evidence that generally supports the
importance of the value and size effects (Eichholtz and Huisman 2001, Bond,
Karolyi and Sanders 2003, Hamelink and Hoesli 2004). There is also empirical
evidence for the significance of macro variables, such as the local term spread
and an indicator of a country’s economic openness in pricing international
real estate securities (Bardhan, Edelstein and Tsang 2008). Nevertheless, the
literature to date stops short of jointly estimating the relative impact of the three
factors derived from the international asset pricing models on the time-series
of international real estate security returns.
Research suggests that the relationship between the returns on (international)
real estate securities and the performance of the underlying direct real estate
markets is weak.5 This result seems puzzling as theory suggests that the two
markets are linked through the relative cost of capital (Carlson, Titman and
Tiu 2010). In parallel, the meltdown of global real estate markets in 2008 has
fuelled considerable interest in the factors that facilitate the rapid appreciation
and subsequent decline of international real estate values. Theory predicts
complex interactions between the real and financial sectors in propagating
shocks through the economy (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist 1996, Kiyotaki
and Moore 1997), but the direction of the relationship between credit and real
estate values remains unclear. Research has established evidence that credit
fuels house prices (Mian and Sufi 2009, Glick and Lansing 2010, Pavlov and
Wachter 2011b) and that house prices influence credit supply (Goetzmann,
Peng and Yen 2012). Further, research on the nature of the mechanism through
which credit conditions affect house prices is scarce, our understanding of
the channels through which financial intermediation, and especially the price
of credit, rather than credit volume, affects global real estate values remains
incomplete.6
5See, for example, Giliberto (1990), Martin and Cook (1991), Myer and Webb (1993),
Seck (1996), Ling and Naranjo (1999), Clayton and MacKinnon (2001), Clayton and
MacKinnon (2003), Gyourko and Keim (1992) and Pavlov and Wachter (2011a).
6The distinction between residential and commercial real estate in this context is not
trivial as the marginal price-setting investor in the commercial sector is likely to be an
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We provide a comprehensive analysis that jointly examines the main empir-
ically testable implications from the three major international asset pricing
models as they pertain to global market risk, foreign exchange and inflation
risk. Therefore, we offer an attempt to unify prior research into global versus
local and macroeconomic factors in international real estate securities returns.
We employ this framework in order to explore an additional return-driving fac-
tor. This factor relates to the potential systematic underpricing of put options
embedded in nonrecourse loans for real estate assets.7 We exploit data on global
real estate firms in order to determine the influence of macroeconomic factors
on firm returns and relate firm-level asset pricing to a potential mechanism of
interaction between real and financial markets.
Methodology
Macroeconomic Risk Factors
Our primary objective is to establish empirical evidence for the role of macroe-
conomic factors in explaining the time-series of returns from international real
estate securities.8 We adopt the perspective of a U.S. investor in this study,
focusing on US$-denominated returns, US Treasury bills as the risk-free rate
and foreign exchange rate risks measured relative to the US$. We estimate the
following global panel model, allowing for random security-specific effects, as
indicated by a Hausman test:
rjt = θ0 + θ1rwt + θ2r⊥ct + θ3r⊥et + θ4et + θ5λt + θ6iUSt + ωjt, (1)
where rjt is the excess monthly total return over the risk-free rate on security
j . All predictors are expressed as excess returns over the risk-free rate. The
residual ωjt = jt + ξ j contains security-specific effects. We cluster standard
errors by firm to be robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Hoechle
2007, Petersen 2009, Thompson 2011). We also include year fixed-effects to
account for latent macroeconomic shocks.
International asset pricing models typically consider firm returns to be posi-
tively related to a global market factor. We therefore include the returns on a
institution holding a diversified portfolio of assets. Theory predicts that a diversified
investor will place relatively more importance on systematic risk and less importance
on idiosyncratic risk.
7As such, this study also builds on the prior work of Pavlov and Wachter (2009), Pavlov
and Wachter (2004), Pavlov and Wachter (2006), Allen (2001) and Allen and Gale
(1999).
8We focus on the time-series of returns instead of testing the cross section as the number
of cross-sectional units (countries) in the final sample is small (20 countries).
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global stock market proxy, rwt , in our regression. Following Bond, Karolyi and
Sanders (2003), we add a residual country factor, r⊥ct , from the projection:
rct = αc + βcrwt + 	ct , (2)
where rct is the monthly excess total return on country c’s main stock market
index over the risk-free rate, rwt is the monthly excess world market return and
	ct is the residual representing the orthogonalized country factor r⊥ct . Similarly,
we control for a residual real estate factor (Bond, Karolyi and Sanders 2003)
from the projection:
ret = αe + βe1rwt + βe2rct + νet , (3)
where variables are defined as in (2), ret is the monthly excess total return on
country e’s EPRA/NAREIT listed real estate index over the risk-free rate and
νet is the residual representing the orthogonalized real estate factor r⊥et .
Theory further predicts a positive relationship between exchange rate risk and
security returns. We decompose the foreign exchange rates of our sample
countries into a common and residual component. This approach helps reduce
multicollinearity between commonly correlated exchange rates and preserves
more information than using a broad index (Vassalou 2000). Specifically, we
project:
rlt = δl +
∑
γlrlt + ηlt , (4)
where rlt is the monthly change (logged ratio of the exchange rate at time
t over t − 1) in currency l’s exchange rate relative to the US$. We regress
rlt on the changes in all remaining L − 1 exchange rates. The ηlt represent
the residual components in currency l. We then obtain a time-series of the
average residual components et . We define the common component from (4)
as κlt = rlt − δl − ηlt . Deviations from the period means κt are collected in φlt
to create a time-series average λt , yielding:
et = 1L
L∑
l=1
ηlt and λt = 1L
L∑
l=1
φlt . (5)
International asset pricing models also consider inflation risks in international
stock returns. We focus on the role of US inflation given the US-centric per-
spective of this study with the use of the US$ as the numeraire currency, and
given the importance of the US economy in a global context. We filter US CPI
data using an ARIMA (0,1,1) specification (Fama and Gibbons 1984, Vassalou
2000). The residuals represent unexpected inflation, which we include in the
regression as iU St (Vassalou 2000).
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The Role of Mispriced Credit
Our second objective is to examine the effect of mispriced credit on the returns
from international real estate securities. Pavlov and Wachter (2004, 2006)
show that mispricing of credit can occur when bank managers’ myopia, limited
liability, deposit insurance or a combination of these factors, render the market
for credit inefficient.
Market inefficiency violates the Modigliani and Miller (1958) assumptions and
thus allows the link between the prices of different forms of capital to break
down. As a result, the price of credit can vary independently of the price of
other forms of capital traded in efficient markets, especially equity. We consider
the case where credit market inefficiency manifests in underpricing of the put
option that is embedded in nonrecourse loans and whose value compensates
the lender for default risk.
Our main hypothesis is primarily based on the work of Pavlov and Wachter
(2009), who argue that underpriced credit inflates the value of real estate assets
and in addition makes real estate markets relatively more sensitive to negative
demand shocks.
We propose that this model has a more general implication for the returns
on listed real estate investment firms. If firms exploit underpriced debt, this
produces excess free cash flow. Firms may use this excess cash to purchase
real estate at inflated values. Firms may also overinvest and pursue inefficient
projects. Managers may employ such a strategy in an attempt to build corporate
empires (Jensen 1986, Jensen and Meckling 1976, Jensen 1993).9 Empire
building commonly detracts from firm value as it is contrary to shareholder
interests.10
Pavlov and Wachter (2009) develop a market-based symptom of underpriced
credit that is exploited in the market. We hypothesise an inverse relationship
between current firm returns and this underpricing symptom in the last period.
Investors disapprove of activities that represent an inefficient use of their funds
(Jensen and Meckling 1976, Jensen 1986, 1993). The underpricing symptom
that investors can observe using past firm returns allows them to assess to some
9For instance, Ghosh et al. (2011) find evidence consistent with empire-building in
REIT capital structure choices.
10While it would be interesting directly to examine the impact of overinvestment, we
believe that this is beyond the scope of this article. In the context of this study, it would
be very difficult to explicitly measure overinvestment driven by underpriced credit as
we cannot observe a counter-factual outcome as to what managers would have done in
the absence of mispriced credit.
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extent whether managers engage in inefficient financing activities enabled by
underpriced credit. Investors can penalize managers for these activities by
bidding down the price of the stock, depressing returns in the current period.
We expect that firms that exploit underpriced credit underperform relative to
those firms that do not exploit inefficient credit markets. In order to test this
hypothesis, we augment the asset pricing model described in (1) with the
underpricing variable, ρjt.
Pavlov and Wachter (2009) suggest that a negative correlation between
changes in the default spread and firm returns indicates underpricing of credit
exploited by the firm. The default spread declines either due to a reduction in
the expected future volatility of firm returns or underpricing of default risk.
Lenders and borrowers have a strong incentive to hide underpricing. No lender
would admit to charging too little for a loan, and no borrower would ever
suggest that their business is riskier than implied by their borrowing rate. It is
therefore impossible for outsiders to distinguish between the two causes of de-
clining default spreads. We need to identify a signal that responds differentially
to the two possible causes of default spread declines.
One such variable is the equity price of the firm, assumed to be efficient. If
the default spread declines because the future expected volatility of the firm
declines, there is little impact on the equity price. Marginal equity investors are
diversified, and individual volatility concerns them only through its impact on
the covariance with the broad market. This effect is likely small.
On the other hand, if the default spread declines because the firm is accessing
underpriced financing, this substantially impacts the equity price. Underpriced
financing is no different than any other underpriced input, and it benefits the
owners dollar for dollar. If underpricing is prevalent in the economy, then it lifts
the asset prices for all assets in fixed supply, such as real estate. This further
benefits the equity holders of real estate firms.
In summary, equity prices increase substantially if the default spreads fall be-
cause of underpricing, and they change little if default spread changes rationally
in response to changes in firm volatility (which is diversifiable). Therefore,
credit underpricing generates a negative correlation between equity returns
and changes in default spreads, while correct pricing generates little or no
correlation. Therefore, we can use the correlation between equity returns and
changes in the default spread as an observable and objective symptom of un-
derpricing. The above reasoning is formally laid out in Pavlov and Wachter
(2009).
Macroeconomic Risk Factors and the Role of Mispriced Credit 249
We calculate this correlation as follows:
ρjt = corr(r j ,Dc ), (6)
where r j is a column vector containing the monthly total returns on security
j from time t − 24 to t and Dc is a column vector containing the monthly
changes in the default spread in security j’s domicile c over the same period.11
We proxy the default spread using the spread in country c’s main lending
and deposit rates (Pavlov and Wachter 2009). Each element in the vector ρjt
corresponds to a monthly observation of a rolling 24-month correlation value.12
We specify the augmented asset pricing model with the lagged values of L.ρjt,
then have:
rjt = θ0 + θ1rwt + θ2r⊥ct + θ3r⊥et + θ4et + θ5λt + θ6iUSt + θ7L .ρjt + ωjt. (7)
If firms exploit underpriced debt, they will exhibit positive values of ρjt. We
anticipate that these firms underperform relative to their peers and expect
a negative sign for the coefficient of the underpricing variable ρjt. The fact
that we lag ρjt also helps alleviate concerns surrounding a potential tautology
between the dependent variable and this predictor containing a function of firm
returns.
Note that the underpricing symptom does not mechanically force a firm exhibit-
ing the symptom to under- or outperform. To see this, recall that the symptom
is based on the correlation between changes in the default spread and stock
returns. A firm can quite easily exhibit the correlation and underperform in the
long run, as we hypothesize. Mechanically, a firm can also exhibit the symptom
and outperform. In other words, a firm that underperforms on average over the
study period can still have short-term fluctuations, positive or negative, depend-
ing on the most recent changes in the default spread in the economy. Even a firm
without any positive return events can exhibit a negative correlation between
returns and spreads simply based on the variation in the magnitude of negative
returns, as the formula for correlation subtracts the mean of each series.
11The focus on the lending spread in the domicile might introduce a bias for firms that
invest and thus potentially borrow in countries outside their domiciles. However, there
appears to be only a small number of firms in this category.
12The choice of this time window balances economic and statistical considerations.
Real investment decisions need to adjust to changes in the cost of borrowing, and the
results must manifest in returns, suggesting a substantial lag before an effect becomes
observable. At the same time, we aim to keep the window short in order to alleviate
smoothing effects. Our main results are robust to employing alternative windows, such
as 12 and 18 months, which we believe are reasonable given the overall length of the
sample.
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We also estimate this model with the underpricing symptom calculated on the
basis of the residual returns filtered using the asset pricing model in (1) instead
of the raw returns as described in (6).
Control Variables
We control for firm leverage using semiannual data on total debt-to-equity
ratios, obtained from SNL. We include the debt-to-equity ratio as potentially
highly levered firms may be more sensitive to changes in the lending spread
even in the absence of mispriced credit or without exploiting any mispriced
credit that may be present.
We control for firm size, proxied by the log of the annual market capitalization of
the firm in millions of current US$ from SNL as this variable may potentially
impact on the responsiveness of firm returns to macroeconomic shocks and
thus influence any relationship we identify between firm performance and the
variables of interest.
We also include an indicator variable that takes the value of one if a firm has
elected the REIT status in order to control for potential differences between
REITs and unregulated real estate investment firms in the sample, as our study
focuses on a period when REIT regimes were introduced in many of the sample
countries. The underlying information is from SNL.
Further, we control for country-level governance using the data set on World-
wide Governance Indicators (WGI) provided by the World Bank, as mispriced
credit may be more easily exploited in countries where governance is weak. The
WGI data comprises six separate governance measures. We have aggregated
these measures into a single, equally weighted average per country and year.
Prior to 2002, the WGI were published on a bi-annual basis. In these cases, we
have included the results from a linear interpolation between the dates available
to fill missing values.
Lastly, we include year- and country-fixed effects in order to capture latent
economic shock factors and country-specific influences, such as changes in
legislation.
Data
Or sample comprises the monthly total returns on all listed real estate investment
firms on SNL Financial. Macroeconomic data on real GDP, CPI and deposit as
well as lending rates are from the IMF, the World Bank and Global Financial
Data (GFD). Monthly total returns on country-level and world stock market
proxies, EPRA/NAREIT country-level listed real estate indices and foreign
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exchange rate data are obtained from Datastream. We include the returns on
the one-month US treasury bill as proxy for the risk-free rate.13
The SNL global database is comprehensive from 1999 onwards. We begin the
full study period in 1999 and end in 2011, covering a full economic real estate
cycle. Return data and GDP are denominated in US, and all foreign exchange
rates are expressed relative to the US$. The initial sample contains data on
585 firms from 20 countries, comprising a total of 60,261 firm-month return
observations.
We construct our sample as an unbalanced panel in order to mitigate any
survivorship bias. Elton, Gruber and Blake (1996) define survivorship bias
as the tendency for failed firms to be excluded from performance studies,
producing skewed results as only firms that were successful enough to survive
until the end of the period are included. We include firms in our sample for as
long as they existed.
Table 1 provides information on the composition of the sample. The majority
of the firms in our sample are from the US (164) and the UK (93), followed
by Hong Kong (49), Singapore (44), Canada (43) and Japan (42). The largest
sample firms are domiciled in the US, Hong Kong, Japan, Australia, France
and Spain.
The average return across all firms is 0.05%. Countries with above-average
returns include Singapore (0.2%) and Hong Kong (0.6%), Sweden (0.3%) and
France (0.5%), as well as the North American markets in the US (0.5%) and
Canada (0.9%). Markets with below-average performance include mainly the
European markets, such as the UK (−0.8%), Italy (−2%) and Spain (−1.1%),
but also Australia (−0.4%). The average standard deviation of monthly returns
is 13.5%. Countries with above-average return volatility largely coincide with
the countries showing poor performance over the study period. Low-volatility
markets are mainly the mature European countries, such as Belgium (5.3%),
Switzerland (4.7%) and Finland (9.0%).
Over the full study period, the median return tends to exceed the mean in some
countries, suggesting that negative outliers may bias the mean returns that may
intuitively appear low in some cases. Table 2 presents the monthly mean total
return by subperiods and shows that the period prior to the recent crisis produces
13The data are obtained from http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/
data/_library.html.
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Table 1  Descriptive statistics for the country-level real estate securities—Full study
period (1999–2011).
Mean Mean Median
Country Firms Market Cap. Return Return S.D. N
Australia 29 2,456.294 −0.443 0.824 13.008 2,970
Austria 7 976.743 −0.863 0.245 12.355 703
Belgium 12 543.632 0.394 0.577 5.265 1,386
Canada 43 863.933 0.886 1.077 11.797 4,502
Finland 3 558.458 0.284 0.386 9.002 400
France 25 2,337.066 0.452 0.408 10.771 3,117
Germany 27 407.706 −1.087 0.000 15.583 1,970
Hong Kong 49 5,431.961 0.634 0.542 13.784 4,846
Italy 5 932.551 −1.953 −0.308 17.460 543
Japan 42 2,797.452 −0.144 0.243 11.146 3,519
Netherlands 8 1339.411 −0.618 0.000 11.585 952
New Zealand 3 525.231 0.630 0.687 4.063 313
Norway 3 853.528 −0.566 −0.303 10.921 230
Poland 2 1,224.319 0.160 0.000 10.796 239
Singapore 44 1,462.337 0.176 0.367 11.380 3,915
Spain 8 2,319.543 −1.063 −0.389 15.507 834
Sweden 13 944.921 0.273 1.180 12.403 1,438
Switzerland 5 1,208.937 0.288 0.386 4.740 566
US 164 2,156.313 0.509 1.147 12.423 19,097
UK 93 906.800 −0.795 0.000 13.672 8,721
Total 585 1,512.357 0.057 0.523 13.485 60,261
Notes: The table presents descriptive statistics for a total of 585 sample firms from
20 countries, resulting in an initial sample size of 60,261 firm-month observations,
recorded over the full study period January 1999 to December 2011. All firm-level
information presented in this table is obtained from the SNL Financial Global Database.
Firms indicates the number of firms included in the sample in a given country, as
determined by the SNL coverage. Mean market capitalization refers to the average
market capitalization of the sample firms in a given country over the study period in
millions of current US$. The table also presents mean and median monthly total returns
of the sample firms in percentage form, alongside their standard deviation (S.D.) and
the number of observations (N).
on average higher and less volatile return values, more consistent with a priori
expectations.14
Panel (A) of Table 3 describes the macroeconomics control variables. The risk-
free rate, proxied by the return on one-month US T-bills, averages 0.2% during
the study period. On average, the MSCI World delivers 0.2% total monthly
14Returns are denominated in US$. The relative performance of the firms across the
subperiods remains consistent when returns are measured in local currency.
Macroeconomic Risk Factors and the Role of Mispriced Credit 253
Table 2  Descriptive statistics for the monthly total return on country-level real estate
securities—Selected subperiods.
2002–2011 2002–2007
Country Mean Return S.D. Mean Return S.D.
Australia −0.499 13.272 1.410 6.022
Austria −1.097 13.291 −0.120 4.736
Belgium 0.435 5.478 0.724 4.232
Canada 0.908 10.893 1.671 9.223
Finland 0.504 9.742 1.943 6.824
France 0.389 10.513 1.327 9.676
Germany −1.194 15.281 0.705 15.518
Hong Kong 0.653 13.826 2.071 12.881
Italy −2.856 17.459 0.540 7.901
Japan −0.236 10.815 1.449 8.899
Netherlands −0.749 12.512 0.951 5.125
New Zealand 0.630 4.063 1.131 3.693
Norway −0.486 11.67 1.331 6.449
Poland 0.461 10.834 2.413 10.36
Singapore 0.385 11.258 1.889 8.53
Spain −1.564 16.584 2.512 12.135
Sweden 0.295 12.485 1.625 9.751
Switzerland 0.355 4.797 0.705 3.756
US 0.465 12.605 0.936 7.429
UK −1.041 14.206 0.563 9.151
Total −0.001 13.515 1.361 10.554
Notes: The table presents descriptive statistics on the total monthly return for a total of
585 sample firms from 20 countries, resulting in an initial sample size of 60,261 firm-
month observations. The return data are presented for two subperiods, (1) the period
following the introduction of US REITs into the broader stock market indices, which
may have influenced investor awareness with regard to listed real estate investment
firms, that is the subperiod 2002–2011, and (2) the period prior to the onset of the global
financial crisis, that is the subperiod 2002–2007. All firm-level information presented
in this table is obtained from the SNL Financial Global Database. Monthly total returns
of the sample firms are presented in percentage form, alongside their standard deviation
(S.D.).
return. The country and real estate residuals do not seem to offer a positive
premium over the risk-free rate during our study period. The residual and
common currency factors are slightly negative (−0.2%). US inflation averaged
0.2% per month during the study period. The mean country governance score
is 1.4. Panel (B) presents the firm-level controls we include. The mean debt-
to-equity ratio is 1.9; the mean firm size is US$1.9 billion the mean rate
of investment is 3.5% and approximately 48% of the observations are from
REITs.
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Table 3  Descriptive statistics for the control variables—Full study period (1999–
2011).
Panel (A): Macroeconomic Control Variables
Variable Mean Median S.D. N
Risk-free rate 0.206 0.150 0.167 155
MSCI 0.174 0.639 4.864 155
Country residual 0.006 0.038 3.610 155
Real estate residual 0.007 0.215 5.411 155
Currency residual −0.205 −0.189 0.329 155
Common currency factor −0.204 −0.302 1.984 155
US inflation 0.205 0.202 0.407 155
Country governance 1.401 1.430 0.207 155
Panel (B): Firm-Level Control Variables
DE ratio 1.855 1.010 4.395 51,613
Firm size (in US$ mil.) 1,880.210 677.229 3,934.682 60,972
Rate of investment 0.035 0.000 1.546 21,783
Proportion of observations with
REIT status dummy 0.484 0.000 0.500 106,000
Notes: The table presents descriptive statistics on the control variables included in our
regression model, summarized over the period January 1999 to December 2011. Panel
(A) contains the macroeconomic variables. The risk-free rate is the monthly total return
on one-month US Treasury bills obtained from Kenneth French’s database. MSCI is
the monthly total return on the MSCI world stock market index. The country residual
is obtained from regressing the monthly excess (over the risk-free rate) total return on
country c’s main stock market index on the monthly excess total world stock market
return and collecting the residuals that represent the orthogonalized country factors. The
real estate residual is obtained from a projection of the monthly excess total return on
country c’s EPRA/NAREIT listed real estate index on the corresponding excess return on
the world stock market index and the country’s main stock market index and collecting
the residuals that represent the orthogonalized real estate factor. The currency residual
is obtained from projecting the monthly change in country c’s exchange rate relative
to the US$ on the changes in all other countries’ exchange rates relative to the US$
and collecting the residuals, which we average to obtain the residual currency factor.
The common currency factor is obtained from averaging the deviation from the mean
predicted values of this projection (excluding the constant). US inflation is the change
in the CPI index. All macroeconomic data are presented in percentage format. Country
governance is the equally weighted average of the six component scores of the World
Governance Indicators obtained from the World Bank. Panel (B) contains the firm-level
control variables. DE ratio is the debt-to-equity ratio of the sample firms. Firm size is
the market capitalization of the sample firms in millions of current US$. The rate of
investment is the annual change in net real estate investment relative to the beginning
of period net real estate investment (in decimal form). REIT status is a dummy variable
that takes the value of one if a firm has elected the REIT status. All firm-level data is
from SNL.
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Table 4  Descriptive statistics for the underpricing variable—Full study period (1999–
2011).
Country Mean Median S.D. N
Australia 0.035 0.048 0.250 2,859
Austria 0.024 0.026 0.274 776
Belgium 0.036 0.037 0.280 1,237
Canada 0.048 0.036 0.261 4,108
Finland 0.006 0.022 0.207 399
France −0.025*** −0.019 0.228 2,808
Germany 0.053 0.048 0.264 2,080
Hong Kong 0.149 0.148 0.270 4,447
Italy −0.030*** −0.032 0.225 580
Japan −0.131*** −0.140 0.284 3,949
Netherlands 0.081 0.074 0.195 878
New Zealand −0.001 −0.035 0.290 310
Norway 0.041 0.012 0.181 244
Poland 0.087 0.130 0.174 223
Singapore 0.021 0.031 0.268 3,709
Spain 0.013 0.004 0.249 834
Sweden −0.030*** −0.046 0.297 1,480
Switzerland −0.103*** −0.025 0.321 609
US −0.037*** −0.037 0.269 17,292
UK 0.048 0.051 0.256 8,662
Notes: The table presents the descriptive statistics for the underpricing variable. The
underpricing variable is the rolling 24-month correlation between the returns on the
listed real estate firms in a country and the monthly change in the default spread in the
corresponding country. A significant negative value indicates significant mispricing of
credit exploited by the listed real estate firms in the country on average over the study
period 1999 to 2011. Asterisks denote the results from a t-test for H0 : mean = 0 versus
HA : mean < 0. Significance is indicated as follows: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p <
0.10.
Table 4 describes the underpricing variable by country. The mean is slightly
negative for France, Italy, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland and the US, suggesting
that these countries on average exhibit the underpricing symptom. The standard
deviations of the underpricing variable are in excess of 20% for most countries.
This fact suggests significant variation of the underpricing variable. Pavlov
and Wachter (2009) suggest that a negative correlation between changes in
the default spread and firm returns indicates the exploitation of underprices
credit. Figure 1 shows that the global average of the underpricing variable was
negative in the run-up to the recent crisis, suggesting that firms were able to
exploit underpriced debt in this period.
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Figure 1  Time-series evolution of underpricing variable—Global average. The
figure shows the time-series evolution of the global average of the lagged underpricing
variable over the study period. The underpricing variable is the rolling 24-month
correlation between the returns on the listed real estate firms in a country and the
monthly change in the default spread in the corresponding country. A significant
negative value indicates significant mispricing of credit exploited by the listed real
estate firms in the country on average over the study period 1999 to 2011.
Time series evolution of underpricing variable, global average
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Table 5 reports the pairwise correlations between the predictors and generally
shows low levels of correlation. The correlation between investment growth
and underpricing is positive, suggesting that managers may exploit underpriced
credit and simultaneously invest more.
Results
Table 6 presents the main regression results for the full study period 1999–
2011.15 Specification (1) corresponds to the augmented global asset pricing
15The results are robust to focusing on the period following the introduction of US REITs
into the broader stock market indices in 2001, which may have influenced investor
awareness with regard to listed real estate investment firms, that is the subperiod 2002–
2011. The results are also robust to focusing on the period prior to the onset of the global
financial crisis, that is the subperiod 2002–2007.
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model. Specification (2) employs the lagged underpricing variable as an in-
strument to predict the country residual in the model. In specification (3), we
replace the original underpricing variable with an alternative based on the resid-
ual returns that have been filters using the general international asset pricing
model that considers market, inflation and exchange rate factors. Specification
(4) includes a dummy variable to indicate firms that exploit underpriced credit
to a significant degree, measured as ρ j t > 0.2.
Consistent with theory and empirical research in industrial stocks (Vassalou
2000, Hou, Karolyi and Kho 2011), the global stock market is highly significant
in explaining the time-series of international real estate securities returns. This
finding is also consistent with previous research in real estate securities (Ling
and Naranjo 2002, Bond, Karolyi and Sanders 2003). The coefficient is approx-
imately one, suggesting that international real estate securities returns respond
almost directly proportionally to fluctuations in the world stock market.
We also find evidence for the significant positive impact of a country residual
on the time-series of international real estate securities returns. Our result is
consistent with the view that there are local stock market factors that drive
real estate securities returns in a country beyond the stock market fluctuations
captured in the global stock market proxy (Ling and Naranjo 2002, Bond,
Karolyi and Sanders 2003).
The residual performance of a country’s real estate securities index, net of the
influence of the global and local stock markets, also seems positively related to
the time-series of international real estate securities returns (Ling and Naranjo
2002, Bond, Karolyi and Sanders 2003). This finding supports the notion of
real estate securities as a diversifying asset class relative to industrial stocks.
The common component of foreign exchange rate fluctuations appears to be
significantly positively related to the time-series of international real estate
securities returns. This finding is consistent with Vassalou (2000) and implies
that during the study period, investors were better off not hedging exchange
rate exposure as hedging may have eliminated the positive return response to
these fluctuations.
US inflation has a significantly positive impact on the returns from international
real estate securities. This finding implies that these securities appear to be able
to provide a hedge against US inflation, consistent with findings reported in
Vassalou (2000) for general stocks. Country governance generally appears to be
inversely related to excess firm returns, suggesting that investors earn a positive
risk premium for exposure to countries where governance is weaker. Firm size
seems to be significantly positively related to excess firm returns, suggesting
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that larger firms outperform smaller firms.16 Lastly, REIT status appears to be
positively related to excess firm returns, suggesting that REIT firms on average
outperform their non-REIT counterparts.
The lagged underpricing symptom seems significantly negatively related to the
time-series of international real estate securities returns. The returns on firms
that exploit underpriced credit will have a negative correlation with changes
in the lending spread in their respective countries. Those firms are likely to
underperform relative to their peers. On the other hand, the returns on firms
that do not exploit underpriced credit will have a nonnegative correlation with
changes in the local lending spread and do not systematically underperform.
This mechanism is captured in the negative sign of the coefficient on the
lagged underpricing variable. In other words, investors are able to observe the
relationship between past firm returns and the local lending spread and assess
whether firms exploit underpriced credit using the information set available at a
given time. Investors are then able to adjust their pricing of the firm’s equity and
bid down the price of firms that exploit underpriced credit. Note however that
the symptom we employ appears to be building up slowly. Investors require
sufficient time to observe the correlation between firm returns and changes
in the default spread in order to assess any exploitation of underpriced credit
before bidding down the stock.
This relationship is consistent with the loan underpricing theory of Pavlov and
Wachter (2009). When property owners take advantage of underpriced credit,
they benefit in the short-run but expose themselves to long-term difficulties
for two reasons. First, the underpriced credit is likely to disappear eventually,
leaving them exposed to cost of credit increases even if the overall interest
rates in the economy have not changed. Second, operating in a market where
underpriced credit is prevalent is risky, as this market is likely to experience
larger price declines in an economic downturn. Managers of publicly traded
real estate companies appear to exploit underpriced credit as they can reap the
benefits of short-term profitability and have limited downside. Shareholders,
interested in the long-term performance of the firm are not in favor of taking
advantage of underpriced credit for a number of reasons. First, such borrowing
increases the long-term vulnerability of the firm exposes it to larger downside
risks. Second, a manager taking advantage of underpriced credit is also likely to
engage in empire building, thus growing the firm beyond its optimal size and/or
16This finding generally appears inconsistent with the general asset pricing literature
suggesting that smaller firms tend to outperform larger firms (Fama and French 1993).
However, small stocks tend to outperform big stocks only over long periods and in
relatively stable conditions. In a period such as the recent crisis, small stocks could
easily underperform.
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undertaking investments that would detract from firm value in the absence of
underpriced credit. Therefore, firms that take advantage of underpriced credit
appear to underperform.
Our results shed light on the overall link between credit conditions and asset
prices. Much of the related existing literature focuses on the interaction between
house prices and credit, but our approach is the first to study this interaction
in the context of publicly traded companies. A number of studies document
house price increases in the presence of cheap credit, and easing of credit in
response to price increases. While it is not surprising that privately held real
estate experiences increase and decrease in value and performance over the
credit cycle, one might expect that the investors in publicly traded companies
have the foresight to underweight firms that take advantage of underpricing at
all times.17
Research commonly finds evidence for the significance of a country or regional
residual (Ling and Naranjo 2002, Bond, Karolyi and Sanders 2003). However,
the literature has not yet established what drives this residual country factor.
Our results from employing the lagged inverse underpricing variable to predict
the country residual in our asset pricing model, especially the high values
of the rank statistics assessing instrument relevance and strength, suggest that
the country residual may be partly driven by local credit market conditions
(specification (2)).
Further, we replace the original underpricing variable with an alternative based
on the residual returns filtered using the general international asset pricing
model that considers market, inflation and exchange rate factors. Our finding
is robust to using the filtered series (specification (3)).
We also include a dummy variable to indicate firms that exploit underpriced
credit to a significant degree at a given point in time, measured as ρInv > 0.2
(specification (4)). The constant indicates the risk-free rate of return that in-
vestors can earn beyond the returns generated through exposure to the macroe-
conomic and firm risk factors included in our model. The coefficient on the
dummy variable indicates the marginal return that investors can earn by in-
vesting in the firm type corresponding to the indicator variable. The coefficient
on the firm-type dummy in our model is negative and significant, suggesting
17This expectation would force such firms to underperform even during credit expansion
periods. Instead, we find (in unreported results) that even publicly traded firms that
exploit underpriced credit outperform during credit expansion periods. The implication
is that publicly traded equity on its own does not seem to be able to eliminate the
incentives for exploiting underpriced debt.
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Table 7  Robustness tests on threshold for UPRIC dummy variable—Full study period
(1999–2011).
(1) (2)
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic
UPRIC Dummy 0.1 −0.00∗∗ −2.0
UPRIC Dummy 0.2 −0.00∗ −1.8
UPRIC Dummy 0.3 −0.00∗∗ −2.5
UPRIC Dummy 0.4 −0.01∗∗∗ −2.9
UPRIC Dummy 0.5 −0.01∗∗∗ −2.6
UPRIC Dummy 0.6 −0.01∗∗∗ −3.0
UPRIC Dummy 0.7 −0.02∗∗∗ −3.1
UPRIC Dummy 0.8 −0.02∗∗∗ −2.9
UPRIC Dummy 0.9 −0.02∗∗∗ −2.8
Observations 41,451
Firm clusters 571
Notes: The table presents an extract of the results from a regression of a global panel
of monthly excess firm returns on a dummy variable UPRIC Dummy that takes the
value of one if the underpricing variable exceeds the threshold stated in the row labels.
The regressions control for a constant and all the macroeconomic factors in our main
model (the world stock market, the residual country factor, foreign currency factors,
US inflation as well as controls for leverage, firm size, REIT status and country-level
governance), but coefficients for the control variables are not shown here. We include
dummy variables to capture country and year effects. Significance is indicated as follows:
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.
that investors can improve risk-adjusted returns by avoiding firms that exploit
underpricing.
We have estimated a set of additional regressions including different versions
of the underpricing dummy variable defined by a range of thresholds from 0.1
to 0.9 in steps of 0.1 (Table 7). Our main conclusions are robust to choosing
different thresholds for the definition of the dummy variable. In addition, the
sequence of dummy variables allows us to some extent to examine potential
aspects of nonlinearity in the relationship between the exploitation of under-
priced credit and excess firm returns. Our results show that the coefficients
of the dummy variables measured at different thresholds become increasingly
negative as the threshold values increase. We interpret this finding as evidence
consistent with the notion that the increasing use of underpriced credit may
have an increasingly negative impact on returns.
As far as the potential for improvements on risk-adjusted returns is concerned,
the use of alternative thresholds for the definition of the dummy variable sug-
gests that the marginal risk-adjusted return to be achieved by avoiding firms
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that exploit underpricing increases in the extent to which these firms exploit
mispriced credit.18
However, this finding does not necessarily imply that firms that do not exploit
underpricing are just as beneficial for improving investment performance as the
firms that exploit underpriced credit have a detrimental impact on performance.
Overall, this part of our analysis allows us to conclude that avoiding firms that
exploit underpricing helps investors achieve better risk-adjusted returns because
these firms contribute negatively to risk-adjusted returns.
Robustness Tests
We explore several perspectives on the robustness of our findings. Table 8
presents the results on these robustness tests. First, it is possible that the signifi-
cance of the underpricing-related variables are driven by changes in the cost of
debt. Our focus is on firms exploiting errors in the pricing of debt in the banking
system. We include (1) changes in the lending spread and (2) the lending rate
in order to control for this effect (see column (1)). The change in the lending
spread is not significant and does not detract from the significance of the un-
derpricing variable. Also, the magnitude of the coefficient on the underpricing
variable remains fairly stable as compared to the original specification. The
lending rate itself is significant, but again does not detract from the significance
of the underpricing variable, suggesting that our results are robust to controlling
for different aspects of the cost of debt.
We control for the residual country general stock market performance, net of
the impact of the global stock market. This variable arguably captures business
cycles through the observed variation in the stock market return. However, we
have added an interaction term between this country residual and the underpric-
ing variable in order to gauge any potential differential relationships between
underpriced credit and firm performance throughout different periods of the
business cycle (see column (2)). Our results remain robust to this additional
control.
We have also added the square of the underpricing variable to the regression
model as an alternative measure of nonlinearities in this relationship (see col-
umn (3)). Our main findings are robust to the inclusion of the square term,
but this term itself is insignificant. However, the inclusion of a square term of
18Consistently, we find in unreported results that an inverse specification of the firm type
dummy to indicate firms that do not exploit underpricing, measured as ρ j t < −0.2, is
insignificant.
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Table 9  Robustness test on nonreal estate stocks.
(1) All Stocks (2) All Stocks Winsorized
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
MSCI 1.38∗∗∗ 11.5 1.30∗∗∗ 17.1
CTRY 1.17∗∗∗ 4.9 1.00∗∗∗ 6.2
FXRES −7.67∗∗∗ −6.0 −8.59∗∗∗ −11.5
FXCOM 0.10 0.4 −0.06 −0.2
USIN 7.27∗∗∗ 7.3 5.62∗∗∗ 6.6
L.UPRIC 0.04 0.2 −0.11 −0.7
Constant 1.52∗∗∗ 20.0 1.52∗∗∗ 20.1
Observations 107,906 107,906
Firm clusters 1,175 1,175
Country fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Notes: The table shows the robustness test for nonreal estate, industrial firms. The
regression replicates the base specification for this broader set of firms. We regress a
global panel of monthly excess firm returns on the inverse of the lagged underpricing
variable L.UPRIC. We employ the following control variables: MSCI is the monthly total
return on the MSCI world stock market index. The country residual CTRY is obtained
from regressing the monthly excess (over the risk-free rate) total return on country c’s
main stock market index on the monthly excess total world stock market return and
collecting the residuals that represent the orthogonalized country factors. The currency
residual FXRES is obtained from projecting the monthly change in country c’s exchange
rate relative to the US$ on the changes in all other countries’ exchange rates relative to
the US$ and collecting the residuals, which we average to obtain the residual currency
factor. The common currency factor FXCOM is obtained from averaging the deviation
from the mean predicted values of this projection (excluding the constant). U SI N is
unexpected US inflation from filtering the monthly change in the CPI index using an
ARIMA (0,1,1) specification and collecting the residual. Significance is indicated as
follows: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.
a variable introduces significant collinearity with the main effect of this vari-
able, potentially driving out the significance of the square term. Therefore, we
focus our examination of potential nonlinearities in the relationship between
underpriced credit and firm returns on the sequence of dummy variables.
In addition, the coefficient of the inverse correlation could also capture the
impact of momentum in excess firm returns. We have expanded our robustness
tests to control for momentum, using the lagged six-month buy-and-hold return
on the sample firms (see column (4)). Our results are robust to controlling for
return momentum.
Further, we examine the relationship between underpriced credit, invest-
ment behavior and firm performance. We add an interaction term between
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underpriced credit and investment growth, measured as the annual change in
net real estate investment relative to the beginning of period net real estate
investment holdings from SNL. The coefficient on the interaction term be-
tween the two variables is negative and significant (column (5)). Our results
are therefore consistent with the hypothesis that managers using underpriced
credit underperform if they invest more.
Lastly, our hypothesis refers to underpricing of bank debt. This perspective
implies that we expect this relationship to be specific to real estate firms since
traditional industrial firms are less heavily reliant on bank debt. We should thus
not observe a significant impact of the underpricing variable in the returns on
industrial firms.
We replicate our analysis for a panel of nonreal estate firms from the main
stock market indices of the countries in which we find a significant relation-
ship between the underpricing variable and the returns on listed real estate,
namely Australia, Austria, Norway, New Zealand, Poland and Spain (Table 9).
As expected, the underpricing variable is not significant. The mechanism of
interaction between the real and financial sectors that we describe here relies
on a direct response in the prices of real assets to changes in the credit con-
ditions. This link is especially tight in the real estate sector. However, the real
estate markets in the countries with significant underpricing of credit may be
relatively smaller and, in some cases, less mature.
Conclusion
The benefits of diversification through international real estate securities are
well established, but their return drivers are unclear. To date, the nature and
pricing rationale of international real estate securities are not fully understood.
We jointly test the canonical implications of the three major international asset
pricing models. Consistent with prior research, we find that international real
estate securities are strongly related to a global market factor, but they appear to
offer diversification benefits as country and residual real estate factors remain
highly significant. International real estate securities correlate with common
currency fluctuations but appear to provide a hedge against US inflation. We
contribute to the literature on the drivers of the returns generated by international
real estate securities by documenting the significant role of macroeconomic
factors in explaining these returns.
In addition, we find evidence consistent with our hypothesis that the exploitation
of underpriced debt is reflected in security returns and partly drives the residual
country factors. This finding is robust to controlling for various aspects of
the price of credit. We can also establish that this finding does not hold for
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firms outside the real estate sector where inefficiencies in the credit market are
less relevant and where the links between the real and financial aspects of the
industry are less tight.
Having said that, we find that underpriced credit may be exploited especially in
countries with smaller, less developed listed real estate sectors, suggesting that
market maturity may have a role in limiting this phenomenon. More generally,
our findings contribute to the literature on the interaction between real and
financial markets by offering evidence on the role of the price of credit in
determining asset returns.
Our findings further provide evidence in favor of the view that investors can
employ information about past firm returns to assess to some extent whether
managers engage in inefficient activities enabled by underpriced credit. There-
fore, our findings imply that investors are able to make more efficient decisions
about capital allocation by examining the underpricing variable employed in
this study. Investors are able to identify and bid down the price of the firms that
engage in empire-building strategies.
Our results are also consistent with prior work suggesting that the use of
underpriced credit exacerbates the asset price cycle both during the expansion
and contraction periods. This work is usually focused on nontraded assets or
accounting measures of profitability or performance. Our study is the first,
to the best of our knowledge, to use data on actively traded, publicly listed
firms, that are commonly considered to be priced efficiently. The significant
and persistent stock market underperformance that we document for companies
using underpriced credit suggests that investors have the ability to ultimately
detect the exploitation of underpriced credit.
Our analysis captures overreliance on underpriced credit and its effect on firm
performance. This effect may be driven by firms exploiting underpriced credit
to purchase assets at inflated prices (Pavlov and Wachter 2009) or by firms
engaging in overinvestment. Future research may consider directly modelling
overinvestment fuelled by underpriced credit and examining its impact on firm
performance.
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